Memo

To: Participants in Duke Anti-Americanism Workshop
From: Christopher Candland
Date: February 17, 2004
RE: Anti-Americanism in Indonesia and Pakistan

According to some scholars, anti-Americanism is rooted in envy. Paul Johnson, a British historian, in a *Forbes* column he shares with Casper Weinberger, Lee Kuan Yew, and Ernesto Zedillo, argues that

> Anti-Americanism is factually absurd, contradictory, racist, crude, childish, self-defeating and, at bottom, nonsensical. It is based on the powerful but irrational impulse of envy – an envy of American wealth, power, success and determination.[1]

Whether or not anti-Americanism is absurd or nonsensical, it is real. Anti-Americanism influences world politics. In Pakistan, the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan, that began in October 2001, has been so unpopular, especially in the provinces bordering Afghanistan, where errant bombs fall, that a coalition of religious political parties was ushered into the assemblies of these provinces. These election results were unexpected. Religious parties had been so unviable in previous elections that they stopped competing. Anti-Americanism gave these parties new life. The refusal of these provincial governments to cooperate with the U.S. military in its campaign against suspected *Al Qaida* and *Taliban* forces has had a significant influence on the U.S. War on Terror. In Indonesia, anti-Americanism is likely to have a strong effect on the April 2004 general elections. Indonesians consider the ruling People's Democratic Party of Struggle and its leader Prime Minister Megawati Sukarnoputri to be unduly pro-United States. Support for Islamic political parties that are decidedly less supportive of the United States is apparently growing. Even in Kuwait, which, according to the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, has the highest level of favorable views of the U.S. in the Islamic world, conservative Islamic candidates defeated liberal candidates in the early July 2003 elections. Political analysts attribute the unexpected electoral results to the rising anti-American sentiments in the region.

Who of Us Do They Hate?

U.S. President George W. Bush articulated the "they envy us" explanation for anti-Americanism in his address of September 20, 2001. "Why do they hate us?" he asked. Because "they hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedoms of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other" he answered.[2] The question "why do they hate us?" is skillfully articulated in a presumptuous way. The question prefigures the answer by presuming what "they"

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[1] Paul Johnson, "Anti-Americanism Is Racist Envy," *Forbes*, July 21, 2003.
[2] See George Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress," September 20, 2001, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/. Former U.S. President's Secretary of State Madeline Albright had earlier expressed the same sentiment. "[W]e stand for freedom and rule of law and democracy and that's what they don't believe in and so they have decided that we are the enemy." Cited in "US Bombings Backfire," *Washington Watch*, August 24, 1998.

hate. "They" hate "us," all of us. More relevant and potentially revealing questions are: "What do they hate about us?" and, more pointedly still, "Who of us do they hate?"

And Who Are They?

The question "why do they hate us?" also carefully avoids another important element of the inquiry: Who are "they"? Are "they" terrorists, Arabs, Muslims, foreigners? Just as it is important to distinguish what is hated about America and the United States, it is also important to know to whom "they" refers. Is it the general public, as reflected in public opinion surveys, or members of specific groups, such as Indonesia's *Laskar Jihad* and Pakistan's *Jamaat-i-Islami*, which are opposed not only to United States policies but also to American values? Available survey data do not capture these distinctions. But it is likely that the cultural and psychological dimensions referred to in Peter Katzenstein and Bob Keohane's research agenda are more salient among these groups. Much of the leadership of the Pakistan's *Jamaat-i-Islami*, for example, confirmed their distaste for American culture while studying in the United States and experiencing a kind of alienation from American culture.

Parsing Economic, Cultural, and Political Factors

To make matters more manageable, I will focus on national averages. But as Peter Katzenstein and Bob Keohane write in their research agenda, it is difficult to parse cultural, political, and psychological explanations. Still similarities, and differences, between Indonesian and Pakistani anti-Americanism and the comparative method do help us to locate the source of anti-Americanism.[3] This memo advances the contention that anti-Americanism is in fact anti-United States Government-ism.

Similar Histories of U.S. Backed-Military Rule

I argue that resentment about the withdrawal of U.S. support is the chief cause of anti-Americanism in Indonesia and Pakistan. In each country, the U.S. supported military governments for decades. Since the military took the reign of government in Pakistan, from 1958 to 1968 and again from 1977 to 1988, the Pakistani government has been the staunchest U.S. ally in the South Asia. Since the resignation of President Sukarno, in 1966, until President Suharto's resignation in 1998, the Indonesian government has been the staunchest ally of the U.S. in Southeast Asia. In each country, as soon as the U.S. backed military government fell from power, the United States began to sanction the new, struggling, democratically elected governments for violation of U.S. human rights standards, including child labor standards, trade rules, and non-proliferation policies.

Thus, Indonesia and Pakistan make a somewhat infelicitous comparative pair for this argument. Each country is similar to the other with respect to the variable under investigation – betrayal by United States during the democratic transition. To isolate the influence of U.S. abandonment on anti-Americanism, it would be better to compare Indonesia with Malaysia and Pakistan with Bangladesh. However,

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[3] While American social scientists built comparative politics on John Stuart Mill's methods of difference and sameness, Mill himself cautioned against applying the comparative method to the social world, where the number of variables involved in any phenomenon (e.g., anti-Americanism) may exceed the number of cases of these phenomena. See John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive Logic*, (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1961, (1843)).

differences between Indonesian and Pakistani respondents to public opinion surveys – including the relative intensity of anti-Americanism and direction of change in that sentiment between 2002 and 2003 – do help us to test the hypothesis that perceived betrayal by the United States is the major source of anti-Americanism in these two societies.

For thirty-two years, from 1965 until 1998, the U.S. supported the military dictatorship of General Suharto. It has come to light recently that by providing names of suspected communists, the U.S. embassy in Jakarta assisted in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of suspected communists. After the Cold War, when Indonesia's steadfast anti-communist polices were no longer as necessary, the U.S. began to threaten and weaken Indonesia. In 1994, the U.S. State Department banned the sale of small arms to Indonesia citing human rights abuses in East Timor. In 1995, the U.S. Trade Representative reviewed Indonesia's eligibility for most-favored nation trading status under the Generalized System of Preferences and threatened to impose trade sanctions, damaging Indonesia's export market. In 1997, when Indonesia faced a financial crisis more serious than any since the collapse of the Third Reich, the U.S. and the International Monetary Fund forced upon Indonesia economic policies that exacerbated the financial crisis and drove millions into poverty. In 1999, the U.S. supported the separation of East Timor from Indonesia. The U.S. government has repeatedly issued travel warnings about Indonesia, crippling Indonesia's tourist industry.

Feelings of resentment and betrayal have similar origins in Pakistan. The United States supported the dictatorship of General Zia ul Haq for 11 years (1977-1988). As soon as the Soviets were out of Afghanistan, the U.S. government sanctioned Pakistan for attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Before the sanctions, in May 1987, 31 percent of those responding to a Gallup poll considered the United States to be untrustworthy. By December 1990, that figure had nearly doubled, rising to 58 percent.[4] In 1990, the U.S. government collected $US 350 million for 28 F-16s that it refused to deliver. The United States, nevertheless, kept the Pakistani money for 15 years and then only repaid a portion of the payment, without interest, keeping the rest as an administrative fee. In 1995, the U.S. Trade Representative reviewed Pakistan's eligibility for most-favored nation trading status under the Generalized System of Preferences and threatened to impose trade sanctions, damaging Pakistan's export market. The U.S. government has repeatedly threatened to place Pakistan on the Department of States list of states that sponsor terrorism and has repeatedly issued travel warnings about Pakistan. Since October 2001, the U.S. military has been bombing Afghanistan, sometimes striking Pakistani territory. As Henry Kissinger said "to be an enemy of America can be dangerous, but to be a friend can be fatal."[5]

Seemingly Different Sentiments about America

Do survey data suggest that Indonesians and Pakistanis feel betrayed by the withdrawal of U.S. support precisely when democratic forces need the U.S. most? According to the Gallup Organization's survey of the Islamic World, contemporary anti-Americanism in Pakistan is more intense than in Indonesia. Indonesia and

[4] Cited in Japan Economic Newswire, "Americans Leaving Pakistan as Anti-Americanism Grows," January 9, 1991.
[5] cited by Mushahid Hussain, "'Anti-Americanism' Has Roots in U.S. Foreign Policy," *Inter Press Service*, October 19, 2001. Mushahid Hussain was the Information Minister of Pakistan until General Musharraf's coup of October 12, 1999.

Pakistan stand at opposite ends among the countries in the Gallop Organization's 2002 poll of attitudes toward America in the Muslim world.[6]

Among the nine countries covered, Pakistanis had the highest unfavorable opinion of the United States; Indonesians had the lowest unfavorable opinion and one of the highest favorable opinions of the United States. Sixty eight percent of Pakistanis surveyed reported a "very unfavorable" or "somewhat unfavorable" opinion of the United States. Only two percent of Pakistanis surveyed had a "very favorable" or "somewhat favorable" view of the United States. By contrast, 30 percent of Indonesians surveyed reported a "very unfavorable" or "somewhat unfavorable" opinion of the United States. A similar portion, 27 percent, reported a "very favorable" or "somewhat favorable" view of the United States. Thus, Pakistani respondents were more than twice as likely as Indonesian respondents to have an unfavorable view of the United States. Indonesian were more than five times as likely to have a favorable view of the United States.

Nation or Government?

The question that elicited these responses, however, was neither about the United States government nor about the American people. Instead, the original English language questionnaire that was translated into Bahasa Indonesian for Indonesian respondents and into Urdu for Pakistani respondents, asked for opinions about a series of "nations," one of which was the "United States."[7]

The "nation" is an ambiguous concept. It may refer to either a people or a political entity, or both. Bahasa Indonesian preserves the distinction between nation, government, and state. The nearest translation for nation in Indonesian (*bangsa*) refers unambiguously to a people, not to a government (*pemerinta*) or to a state (*negara*). *Bangsa* (nation) was the term used in the Indonesian surveys. The nearest translation for nation in Urdu (*quam*) is similar in meaning to the English word "community." It refers to a people but also suggests a people who are defined by their religious identity. The other near translation for nation in Urdu (*mulk*) is similar to the English word country. It combines the sense of territory defined by a state's political authority but also refers to the people who live within that territory. *Mulk* (country) was the term used in the Pakistani surveys.[8] Thus, the Gallup Poll fails to provide a basis for comparing anti-Americanism in Indonesia and Pakistan and, in the case of Pakistan, fail to clarify whether unfavorable opinions of the United States stem from the policies of the U.S. government or from the character of the American people.

People or Policies?

The 2002 and 2003 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press surveys distinguish between attitudes toward Americans and toward the United States government. In July and August 2002, 65 percent of the Indonesian respondents had a favorable view of Americans, and 61 percent reported a favorable view of the United States government. (See attached sheet for all Pew survey responses discussed in this memo.) By May 2003, after the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, the percentage of Indonesian respondents with a favorable view

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[6] See http://www.gallup.com/publications/islamic.asp

[7] *The Gallup Poll of the Islamic World* asked "In general, what opinion do you have of the following nations?" and listed "the United States" among other countries.

[8] Conversations with Eric Nielson, Gallup Poll Organization, February 5 and 17, 2004.

of Americans dropped from 65 to 56, while the percentage of Indonesian respondents with a favorable view of the United States dropped from 61 to 15. Figures in Pakistan differ markedly, and moved in a different direction. In August through September 2002, only 17 percent of Pakistani respondents reported a favorable view of Americans and only 10 percent reported a favorable view of the United States. By May 2003, the percentage of Pakistani respondents with a favorable view of Americans increased from 17 to 38, while the percentage of Pakistani respondents with a favorable view of the United States increased from 10 to 13.

Thus the Pew surveys found that significantly more Indonesian and Pakistani respondents reported unfavorable views of the United States than unfavorable views of Americans. The Gallup survey was not able to make this distinction. Further, the difference in views about Americans and about the United States widened in both countries between 2002 and 2003.

How are we to make sense of the fact that significantly more Pakistani respondents than Indonesian respondents in the Pew survey – like the Gallup Organization's survey – had an unfavorable view of Americans and the United States government? The U.S. sanctions against Pakistan and the sense of betrayal in Pakistan is higher than in Indonesia.

How are we to make sense of the fact that in spring 2003 more Pakistani respondents expressed a favorable view of Americans and the United States than in summer 2002? The U.S. war in Afghanistan began before the summer 2002 survey.

The Pew surveys included follow up questions to those who expressed an unfavorable opinion of the United States government. Such respondents were asked whether it was "America in general" or the "Bush Administration in particular" that was the problem with the United States. Sixty nine percent of Indonesian respondents and 62% of Pakistani respondents reported that it was the Bush administration that was the problem.

Not Anti-American but Anti-United States

What is often called anti-Americanism is rather often an antipathy to U.S. foreign policy and military operations. Anti-Americanism is an inappropriate shorthand phrase for the feelings of hostility presently directed toward the United States government. As such, the phrase "anti-American" risks confusing the object of anti-Americanism – the U.S. government – with Americans and their professed values. In my conversations with Indonesians in December 2002 and January 2003 and in January 2004 and with Pakistanis in December 2002 and January 2003 about their views of the U.S. government and American people, the words *licik* [Bahasa Indonesia: tricky, even treacherous] and *bey-imaan* [Urdu: dishonest] was often used to describe the United States. Americans were usually described as straight-forward and honest.

If "wealth, power, success, and determination" were the source of anti-Americanism, an American, like myself, who travels in Indonesia and Pakistan, including in areas that are thought to be the most anti-American, should encounter hostility. Instead, one often hears "We love you Americans, but we hate your government." Even the most vociferous opponents of the policies of the United States government treat Americans with great hospitality. Indeed, with the significant exception of Daniel Pearl and a few oil company executives, who were

also thought to be U.S. intelligence agents, all the American victims of violence in Pakistan have been U.S. government officials. The same is true in Indonesia. Americans are not targets. Agents, or suspected agents, of the U.S. government are.

Concluding Reflections

Generalized anti-Americanism in Indonesia and Pakistan (as opposed to the special form of anti-Americanism articulated by a some Islamic parties and groups) is a specific variety of the power imbalance theses described by Peter Katzenstein and Bob Keohane's research agenda. It is a specific variety because a power imbalance has been inherent in U.S.-Indonesia and U.S.-Pakistan relations from the very start. The use of that power to sanction and criticize Pakistan governments, since about 1990, and Indonesia governments, since about 1994, is relatively new. Post-September 11 U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and post-September 11 U.S. immigration policies, of course, are also greatly disliked, especially in Pakistan. But anti-Americanism in each country predates the U.S. policies in response to September 11, 2001.

According to analysis of the 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World data conducted by Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro, anti-Americanism in both Indonesia and Pakistan, unlike in many Arab countries, decreases with more formal education and with more contact with Western news sources.[9] I wonder whether that is because hatred of the United States varies according to Muslim identities, which are correlated with educational attainment and access to modern media. That is, I suspect that modernist Deobandi and Muhammadiyah Muslims – who happen to have more formal education and more access to Western news sources – are significantly more anti-United States than traditionalist Barelvi and Nahdlatul Ulama Muslims – who happen to have less formal education and less access to Western news sources. Deobandi and Muhammadiyah political parties are certainly more anti-American than Barelvi and Nahdlatul Ulama political parties. Thus, the argument that "increased exposure to Western information sources could significantly reduce anti-American sentiments in the Muslim World" may be specious.[10] Indeed, in Arab countries greater exposure to news is correlated with greater antipathy to the United States.[11]

U.S. economic and military sanctions complicate the democratization process. Many in Indonesia and Pakistan recall appreciatively the good old days when their military governments protected their country from U.S. unilaterialism. The Pew survey results confirm that contention. In 2002, 73% of Indonesian and 84% of Pakistani respondents considered the military to be a good influence in their country. There is no obvious reason for that support to have declined in 2003. Indeed, in 2003, 74% of Indonesian and 72% of Pakistani respondents considered the U.S. military to be a threat to their country.

[9] Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro, "Education, Media, and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World," November 19, 2003, at: http://econwpa.wustl.edu/eps/mic/papers/0402/0402005.pdf
[10] Ibid., 19.
[11] Ibid., 2-3.

Responses related to American Culture and Ideas

	Indonesia			Pakistan		
	1999	2002	2003	1999	2002	2003
Spread of American Ideas and Customs is Good		20%			2%	
Spread of American Ideas and Customs is Bad		73%			81%	
Like American Culture		59%			4%	
Dislike American Culture		40%			79%	
American Ideas about Democracy are Good		52%			9%	
American Ideas about Democracy are Bad		40%			63%	
Favorable View of Americans		65%	56%		17%	38%

Responses related to U.S. Government and U.S. Foreign Policy

	Indonesia			Pakistan		
	1999	2002	2003	1999	2002	2003
Favorable View of United States	75%	61%	15%	23%	10%	13%
Unfavorable View of United States		36%	83%		69%	81%
Support U.S. War on Terror		31%	23%		20%	16%
Oppose U.S. War on Terror		64%			45%	
U.S. Foreign Policy Considers Others		41%			23%	
U.S. Foreign Policy Does Not Consider Others		49%			36%	
The Problem with the U.S. is President Bush*			69%			62%
The Problem with the U.S. is America in General*			20%			31%

* asked only of those with an unfavorable view of the U.S.

Responses related to Economy, Islam, Globalization, and the Military

	Indonesia			Pakistan		
	1999	2002	2003	1999	2002	2003
Biggest Concern is Economic		84%			59%	
Religious Leaders are A Good Influence		89%			50%	
The Military is a Good Influence		73%			84%	
Worried about U.S. Military Threat			74%			72%
Islam is under Serious Threat*		33%	59%		28%	64%
Effect of Globalization is Good			79%			33%
Effect of Globalization is Bad			13%			9%

* asked only of Muslims

Notes: 1999 figures are from a survey by the U.S. State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research (INR), as reported in Pew Research Center, *What the World Thinks in 2002*, Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2002. 2002 and 2003 figures are from the Pew Research Center surveys conducted in July through October 2002 and April through May 2003. See Pew Research Center *What the World Thinks in 2002*, Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2002 and *Views of a Changing World*, Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2003. Both Pew surveys in Indonesia and Pakistan were biased toward urban residents.